bodied concepts, prototype effects, universal color terms, fuzzy sets, metaphor, construction grammar, etc. There are other creation myths centered in different places and traditions. MB presents an interesting and important story, but it is by no means the only story.
I have not read the whole book and will focus my remarks on Chapter 12, Connectionist Models and Chapter 14, Computational Neuroscience, in reverse order.
One of the most striking things about the Neuroscience chapter is how many of the key discoveries were accidental; one triumph of cognitive science is that we now understand much better why people tend to perceive what they expect (Westen [7] ). It is also striking that these key discoveries were about the properties of specific structures, but that the excitement in modeling was all around theories that minimized the importance of specific circuits-there will be more on that in the conclusion.
My knowledge of neuroscience is amateur, but in reading Chapter 14 I kept being reminded of crucial work that points out errors of omission or commission in MB's treatment of the field and its computational aspects. Here are a few examples.
We hear several times (also in Chapter 12) about Lashley's claim of distributed memory, based on his failure to find the memory trace by ablating parts of rat cortex. But there is nothing at all on Richard Thompson's seminal research showing how these conditioning memories are represented locally in the cerebellum (of rabbit). This was one of the touchstone results of the interdisciplinary efforts of the 1980s and directly involved computational models. Lee and Thompson [4] provide a current view of these developments.
Similarly, we are told that there was no serious consideration of time in neural modeling. This is wrong in several ways. Most basically, much of the argument against GOFAI as a model of the brain involved time and other resource considerations. More technically, there was a continuing modeling effort, led by Moshe Abeles, that focused exactly on timing considerations. This also reminded me to look for references to Leon Cooper, another Nobel Laureate who was very active in neural modeling. I was reminded of him because his very influential BCM model [1] made powerful suggestions about what is now called STDP, spike timing dependent plasticity. He isn't in the name index. Temporal synchrony is mentioned in the section on consciousness, but nothing is said about its extensive use in detailed neural modeling.
Turning to Chapter 12, the term "Connectionism", which MB prefers, was consciously avoided by the New Connectionists around 1980 because "ism" evoked thoughts of ideology rather than science.
Although MB talks a lot about the PDP (and Hopfield) hype, she has not recovered from drinking the Kool Aid. Her discussion of the hype accurately conveys the spirit of the times, but ignores several core truths. For example, MB says (p. 964) that the PDP modelers didn't even try to model propositions. But they did try in all possible ways before giving up. Part of the problem is that PDP (Parallel Distributed Processing) is a contradiction in terms. To the extent that the representation (of a concept) is distributed, multiple concepts can not be processed in parallel. A fully distributed memory can only do one thing at a time, as is noted somewhere in the PDP bible.
We are also told (p. 967) that Elman's simple recurrent networks "learnt to do much the same thing" as speech recognition programs such as Hearsay. This is wrong in several ways. Elman's nets did not take speech input and, in fact, did not recognize anything. They did learn to make rather good predictions of the category of the next word. Any knowledge of grammatical categories was implicit in the weights of the network and therefore not available for any other task, as was well known at the time.
More generally, the core PDP party line, which is not mentioned in the chapter, was that networks were plausibility demonstrations against requisite innateness. It was not that networks were biologically, psychologically or computationally plausible. Rather, if a network this simple could learn a version of the task, there was no reason to assume that the task (e.g. grammar learning) was inherently innate. This was and is an effective argument and has gone far to change the direction of thinking about how the mind could work. But this needs to be distinguished from scientifically viable models of how brains do work.
And what are we to make of MB's statement on p. 975, some hundred pages into the chapter? "After all, the two types of AI (connectionist and symbolic) were in principle equivalent, since both were using general-purpose computational systems." I can't read this in any way that does not suggest someone who just doesn't get the point of computational models in Cognitive Science.
There are two related take-home lessons, not provided by the book. The reason that none of the leading connectionist proposals are widely used is that none of them could compute very much. Hopfield nets and extensions, with their symmetric connections, can only do global relaxation. Kohonen networks are similarly a one-trick pony; they and their extensions can adaptively partition a feature space. We are told that Backprop networks can "compute any function", but this is just table look up and does not entail learning any function. And there is provably no way to achieve position invariance in layered PDP networks. A network trained to recognize some pattern in one position will have no ability to recognize the same pattern in a different position.
More basically, there is a reason why these general computational proposals, like Rosenblatt's Perceptrons before them, were both inherently limited and wildly popular-the universal desire for a free lunch. It would be wonderful indeed if some learning methodology would eliminate the need for detailed analysis and modeling for complex tasks like those involving human intelligence. Both Backprop and Kohonen nets are still in some use, although they have both been largely super ceded by the current great hope-the "New AI" based on statistical learning theory.
There are two suggested uses for this book. In an area that you know well, you can see how it is being portrayed. If you are pursuing a new interest, you could use it (like the Wikipedia) as a starting point. What you can't assume is that you will find even pointers to everything important.
